Sunday, August 26, 2007

Counting the Bodies

Bidish Sarma

Just how many have died in Darfur as a result of the Sudanese government’s violent actions in the region? The answer to that question is extraordinarily difficult to determine. And the estimates provided by different scholars and institutions have proven extremely contentious.

Earlier this month, the United Kingdom’s advertising watchdog, the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA), decided that the Save Darfur Coalition and Aegis Trust misrepresented the death toll of 400,000 in Darfur as a fact rather than as an opinion. It turns out that estimating the number of people who have died – as a direct result of violence and as a result of the government’s intentional abandonment of Darfuris suffering from disease and malnutrition – is very complicated business. Predictably, nobody can look to Khartoum for any help in making a reliable estimate. After all, the government maintains the absurd claim that only 9,000 people have died due to state and rebel combat.

Studies have claimed a range of deaths anywhere from tens of thousands to 450,000. The wide discrepancies between competing figures are explained by assumptions and methodological decisions made by scholars. For example, Professor Eric Reeves has argued that data compiled in a study by the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) in August 2004, though controversial, must be utilized in making an accurate estimation because it is the most comprehensive available to that point in time. To ignore the findings of the CIJ, Reeves, says, “may result in greater methodological hygiene,” but “also ensures that violent mortality will be very dramatically understated.” Reeves concludes “upwards of 450,000 people have died.”

Alex de Waal, on the other hand, argues, “experience counsels caution.” He makes the case for a more moderate estimation: approximately 200,000 deaths. This estimation of mortality relies upon a study conducted by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). De Waal supports the CRED finding as a reasonable middle-ground and articulates the concern that “the press and the humanitarian advocates will seize on the high end figure.”

For individuals concerned about the atrocities occurring in Darfur, the disparate mortality numbers pose two dilemmas: (1) Why do the numbers matter? (2) Which figure should advocates rely upon?

The numbers matter for several reasons. The historical record will be built largely upon post-crisis studies, but popular estimates espoused and embraced while the atrocities were occurring will have an indelible impact on the record. Additionally, an accurate grasp of the scale of the atrocities is necessary to mobilize resources and provide humanitarian relief organizations with the support that they need to succeed. Wildly inaccurate or inflated mortality estimations also provoke controversy, shifting the focus from solving problems on the ground to uncovering the roots of authorship bias. One must wonder, however, if the debate occurring on the numbers in Darfur is unique, or if opinions will always collide in the midst of large-scale humanitarian crises. If the problem is not unique, the numbers matter a little less, especially insofar as there is agreement that something serious is happening that demands the attention of the international community.

As for the numbers that advocates should rely upon, it is safe to say that almost all experts believe at least around 200,000 people have died in Darfur. Although Professor Reeves believes the figure is much higher, he accepts the number 200,000 as an authoritative lower limit. Whether the actual number has crawled above 300,000 or 400,000 remains unclear. The lesson is, although we are unsure of what the reality is, it is critical for us to engage in an honest conversation about the numbers. Advocates should familiarize themselves with the different dimensions of the debate and look into the studies underlying the estimates. So long as advocates possess a coherent rationale for utilizing the figure that they do and so long as they frame the numbers in an honest light, we can all unite on the most important goal of all: stopping the violence and establishing a long-term peace.

Friday, August 17, 2007

Under Pressure from Activists, Sudan Saves Face

Neela Ghoshal

Khartoum’s agreement to allow Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) leader Suleiman Jamous to travel to Nairobi for abdominal surgery, following several months of activist and diplomatic pressure, should be recognized as a rare nod to basic decency and a notable advocacy success. But it should not be taken to reflect a broader commitment to peace and justice in Darfur – not until Jamous, a respected peace-broker, is actually in good health and at the negotiating table.

Jamous, SLA Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator, was detained and tortured last May by former allies in Minni Minawi’s faction of the SLA after that faction signed the deeply inadequate Darfur Peace Agreement, which Jamous rejected.  The UN negotiated his transfer to a hospital at a peacekeeping base in Kordofan, a province bordering Darfur to the east.  He has been confined there under armed guard until yesterday, under threat of arrest by the Sudanese government.

For months, the UN was complicit in his detention, refusing to evacuate Jamous from Kordofan for fear of reprisals.  (Khartoum retaliated against the UN’s 2006 decision to take in Jamous by briefly halting aid workers’ access to Darfur.) UN officials reportedly told Jamous he was free to leave, but that would mean walking into the arms of the Sudanese government.

A flurry of advocacy in recent months has, it seems, successfully altered Jamous’s situation.  His lengthy detention went largely unreported by the Western media, but articles by Eric Reeves, Jen Marlowe, Julie Flint and Ronan Farrow, written between January and June of this year and calling for Jamous’s release, were circulated widely on the internet. An online petition directed at Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon asked for a stronger UN push to free Jamous.  Initiated on July 8 by National Lawyers’ Guild Vice-President Laurie Traktman, it rapidly garnered over 1000 signatures from countries ranging from Sudan and Saudi Arabia to Bermuda and Brazil.

On July 31, Jamous wrote to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, asking to be released in order to participate in talks among Darfuri rebel factions in Arusha.  His request was supported by a letter sent to al-Bashir the same day by Mia Farrow, Desmond Tutu, Vaclav Havel, and other high-profile human rights advocates.  Khartoum suggested in response that it would consider lifting its threat to arrest Jamous, but took no concrete steps in that direction.

On August 6, Mia Farrow again wrote to al-Bashir, offering to give up her freedom in exchange for Jamous’s. She explained in her letter, “I am therefore offering to take Mr. Jamous’s place, to exchange my freedom for his in the knowledge of his importance to the civilians of Darfur and in the conviction that he will apply his energies toward creating the just and lasting peace that the Sudanese people deserve and hope for.”

Meanwhile, on a diplomatic level, the AU’s Salim Ahmed Salim urged Jamous’s release in talks with Khartoum.  U.S. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios apparently did the same, but the extent of his efforts is uncertain: a letter from U.S. Senator Russ Feingold commends Natsios for “requesting” Jamous’s release but urges him “to do your utmost to secure Mr. Jamous’ release… and to immediately reiterate and amplify your appeal to the Sudanese Government for Mr. Jamous’ release and for consent to his participation in both informal and formal peace talks,” suggesting Natsios’s initial efforts may have lacked a sense of urgency.

US State Department spokesman Tom Casey branded Mia Farrow’s publicity move as “naïve” and unhelpful.  But it is clear that activism and public shaming altered Sudan’s calculations – probably more so than quiet diplomacy.  Nearly half the Google hits in English for “Suleiman Janous” also include “Mia Farrow,” demonstrating the reach of Farrow’s star-power in creating outcry around an issue.  And it was on August 7, immediately following Farrow’s sensational offer, that Sudan’s Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Mutrif Siddig stated, “If the international community can guarantee that Suleiman Jamous will undertake only political work and will take part in the political process peacefully and will not return to those holding arms ... we have no problem after that.”

Nor can Jamous’s bold advocacy on his own behalf be discounted.  He failed to make it to talks in Arusha.  But on August 13, Jamous said he would turn himself in to the Sudanese government if the UN would not transport him to Kenya for medical attention by August 16: “If I am detained by the United Nations or the government of Sudan, it is the same.” Following a flurry of diplomacy, the UN reported yesterday that Khartoum will allow Jamous to travel to Kenya and then return to his family without risking arrest on the condition that he not “return to Darfur and fight.”

Jamous, however, has never been a fighter.  As Ronan Farrow points out, “An elderly statesman who has never picked up a gun, Mr. Jamous commands universal respect among the otherwise fractious rebel leaders who control most of rural Darfur.  Because of this, the government of Sudan has aggressively sought to suppress Mr. Jamous.” Jen Marlowe concurs: “Jamous is not a military man, but he may indeed be dangerous” given his “strong ideas about justice in a country whose political leadership ignores the concept.”

It is critical to ensure that Sudan not only permits Jamous to seek medical care, but that it allows him a central role in negotiations, likely to transpire between rebel groups and the government within the next few months.  According to Traktman’s petition, “Jamous’ leadership in Darfur is desperately needed, both to help bring humanitarian relief to the civilian victims of the conflict, and to facilitate peace-making efforts.”

Will Sudan’s recent concession allow him to play this role, or will it serve as a gag order, granting Jamous his health in exchange for his voice in negotiations?  Darfur activists should not let up pressure on Khartoum over the Jamous case until we can rest assured that Jamous will be given space to continue his humanitarian and advocacy efforts.  Jamous has long called on the international community to support the SLA in demanding democracy and political equality in Sudan; now, supporting his freedom is itself a critical space for solidarity.  As Alex DeWaal reminds us in his recent video for 24 Hours for Darfur, “the solution for Darfur lies with Darfurians.  We must support their efforts.”

Monday, August 06, 2007

Pictures Worth A Thousand Words

Neela Ghoshal

Lately, 24 Hours for Darfur has been collecting video appeals at film festivals and theaters at which Annie Sundberg and Ricki Stern’s latest film, The Devil Came on Horseback, is screening.  The film chronicles the experiences of Brian Steidle, a U.S. Marine who worked with the African Union mission in Darfur from 2004 to 2005, and showcases hundreds of photos he shot there: unambiguous evidence of massive crimes against humanity.

The raw emotion elicited by the film – described by Pio J. Cabada, a graduate student of social work at Fordham, as “heartwrenching” – is testament to both the film’s effectiveness as a heartbreakingly visual assault on the senses and to the desire, on the part of many viewers, to be part of a polity that responds to genocide with more than symbolic gestures.

“I had been hearing about Darfur, but I had no idea of the extent of what happened there until I saw the film. There’s not words enough, actually, to describe the genocide that went on,” said Jacqueline Murdock, a dancer from New York.  Leonid Bezborodko, a native of Russia, said he was most struck by the Sudanese army’s use of Russian-made weapons.  “I was ashamed,” he admitted, suggesting that such weapons ought to be used for peacekeeping rather than for inflicting violence on innocent civilians.

Viewers were taken by Steidle’s nearly futile attempts to elicit a response from the U.S. government, which finally called the crisis in Sudan a “genocide” in 2005, but did little toward bringing a concrete resolution to the crisis.  Linda Blacken lamented, “I can’t believe that anyone in our government has seen one of those pictures and not done something, or not felt moved to do something.  That’s just horribly shameful.”

It is not that the U.S. has done nothing – it has provided funds for refugee assistance, implemented sanctions against certain companies owned by Sudanese officials, and pushed for UN peacekeepers in Darfur – but for most viewers, four years of ongoing atrocities speak for themselves.  By failing to commit adequate resources to peace in Sudan, the U.S. shares accountability for over 200,000 deaths there.  “This movie has opened up my eyes to a crisis that I thought in this day and age would never happen,” commented Mariela Sanchez.  A crisis that need not have happened – or that might have been nipped in the bud as early as 2005, when Steidle released his compelling photos – if Darfur had not early on been relegated to what John Prendergast calls a “second tier” rather than a “first tier” concern in U.S. foreign policy.

“I’m going to talk until no one will listen anymore,’’ Steidle says toward the end of the film after receiving a frosty reception from the State Department.  We encourage viewers of the film and visitors to this website to do the same.  Upload an email, spread the word, and make it crystal clear to the world’s power brokers that, as viewer Lucia Hermo insists, “we should not let anything get in the way … of stopping people from dying.”

For information on the film, including upcoming screenings, see www.thedevilcameonhorseback.com and watch Annie Sundberg’s video, below.